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HOW TO PLOT LOVE ON AN
INDIFFERENCE CURVE
B rian H. Bix*

FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN
FAMILY LAW. By June Carbone. New York: Columbia University
Press. 2000. Pp. xv, 341. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $18.50.
INTRODUCTION

In From P artners to Parents: The Second Revolution in Family
Law, June Carbone1 offers nothing less than a whirlwind tour of the
current doctrinal and policy debates of Family Law - an astounding
feat in a book whose main text (excluding endnotes and appendices)
does not reach 250 pages. There seem to be few controversies about
which Carbone has not read widely and come to a conclusion, and
usually a fair-minded one: from the effect of no-fault divorce reforms
on the divorce rate,2 to the long-term consequences of slavery for the
African-American family (pp. 67-84), to whether the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program (prior to the recent re
forms) influenced the number of nonmarital children (pp. 32-33, 96),
just to name three. As it seems impossible to give a faithful overview
in a few pages of a text which is already a remarkable work of conci
sion, this Review will focus on three themes highlighted or implicated
by the book: (1) the title theme - the way family law has changed its
focus from the behavior of adults within a marital or nonmarital rela
tionship ("partners") to the behavior of adults towards their children
("parents");3 (2) the problems for legal reform when our choices are
so deeply affected, and perhaps determined, by history and social
norms; and (3) how an attention to history and culture can be used

* Frederick W. Thomas Associate Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of
Minnesota. D. Phil., Oxford University; J.D., Harvard University. - Ed.
I am grateful to Katharine K. Baker, Margaret F. Brinig, Stephen G. Gilles, Robert W.
Gordon, Leonard J. Long, Eric A. Posner, Warren F. Schwartz, Katharine B. Silbaugh,
Adam Tomkins, Elizabeth Warren, Jamison Wilcox, and those who attended a workshop at
Quinnipiac Law School for their helpful comments and suggestions.

1. Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law.
2. Pp. 86-90. In the course of her discussion, Carbone points to data showing a surpris
ingly constant increase in divorce rates over the last 140 years, with slight drops for mar
riages begun in the 1950s and 1980s. Pp. 86-87.
3. In the language of the subtitle, this is the "second revolution," with the change from a
fault system of divorce to one that is largely no-fault being the first. P. xiv.
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both to deepen and to oppose an economic approach to domestic rela
tions. In connection with this third theme, this Review will also offer
some brief comments on the modem hybrids of law and economics
and family law scholarship.
I.

FROM PA RTNERS TO PA RENTS

There was a time when the common law (and society) created se
vere legal and social handicaps for children born outside of wedlock,
with this being justified as a reasonable way to encourage marriage.4
Starting in the late 1960s, the United States Supreme Court decided a
series of cases holding that legal distinctions grounded on legitimacy
were to be subject to heightened scrutiny.5 Constitutional Law courses
do not spend much time on this issue any more due to the fact that it is
rare to come across cases,6 in large part because the states have re
moved many of the laws that discriminate facially between what we
now call "marital" and "nonmarital" children.7 As a related matter,
the Uniform Parentage Act, adopted by eighteen states,8 has the pur-

4. The traditional perspective was well summarized by James Fitzjames Stephen:
Take the case of illegitimate children. A bastard is filius nullius he inherits nothing, he has
no claim on his putative father. What is all this except the expression of the strongest possi
ble determination on the part of the Legislature to recognize, maintain, and favour marriage
in every possible manner as the foundation of civilized society? . . . It is a case in which a
good object is promoted by an efficient and adequate means.
James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY,
FRATERNITY AND THREE BRIEF ESSAYS 156 (University of Chicago Press 1991) (1873).
Even more telling, if also more strange to modern sensibilities, there was a time when
regulating access to marriage was considered sufficient to control (or at least, to affect
strongly) population. See, e.g., DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE CREATORS 674 (1992) ("Under
the Austro-Hungarian laws designed to curb the Jewish population, only the eldest son in
any Jewish family was allowed a marriage license.").
-

5. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidating a state
rule which prohibited illegitimate children from recovering under a worker's compensation
law when their fathers died); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (striking down a
Louisiana statute excluding illegitimate children from recovery for the wrongful death of a
parent). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 16-24, at
1553-58 (2nd ed. 1988) ("Discrimination Against Illegitimates"). Like discrimination on the
basis of sex, discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy has been held to warrant "intermedi
ate" scrutiny, somewhere between rational basis review and strict scrutiny. Clark v. Jeter,
486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
6. By way of example, one current constitutional law casebook devotes less than four
pages, out of over 1500, to "Illegitimacy and Related Classifications." WILLIAM B.
LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1308-11 (8th ed. 1996).
7. What few cases there have been in the last twenty years have mostly arisen not from
laws which directly discriminate against nonmarital children by denying them some right or
benefit, but which discriminate indirectly, for example, by making it difficult to bring a pa
ternity action. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (striking down a highly re
strictive rule for bringing paternity actions on behalf of illegitimate children).
8. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987 & Supp. 2000).
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pose and effect of "providing substantive legal equality for all children
regardless of the marital status of their parents ...."9
The removal of most legal disabilities for nonmarital children ex
emplifies the basic theme of Carbone's text: Within American family
law there has been a growing doctrinal disconnect between the par
ents' relationship with one another and their rights and obligations re
garding their children.10 There was a time when one's rights and obli
gations towards one's children were defined in a large part indirectly,
by one's relation to the children's other parent. Married parents had
rights and obligations that unmarried parents lacked (p. 164), and
one's chances of gaining custody after divorce (or even after the other
parent's death)11 depended on one's relationship with and behavior
towards the other parent. Marital misbehavior, for example, would be
"punished" by denial of custody (p. 181). The rights of nonmarital
children, and the rights and obligations of unwed parents (especially
unwed fathers)12 to those children, are only the sharpest examples of
this theme. Another prominent piece of evidence for the change of fo
cus is the growing trend of courts to hold allegations of immorality by
a parent irrelevant to a child custody decision unless and only to the
extent that this alleged immorality affects the fitness of that person as
a parent.13 That approach has two apparent advantages: (1) it changes
9. Id. at 289.
10. Pp. xi-xiv, 40-41, 131-32, 154-79, 227-41. Ironically, though the legal treatment of
nonmarital children is a good example of the point Carbone is making, the topic is treated
only briefly in the book, p. 35, and there primarily as an example of the state regulation of
sexual morality.
11. See, for example, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), where the Court consid
ered, and invalidated, a state statute that conclusively presumed that unmarried fathers were
unfit parents, whose children should be taken from them; the case involved an unmarried
father whose children were taken from him under the statute after the mother, with whom
he had cohabited, had died.
12. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (holding that unwed fathers have
constitutionally protected rights in their relationship with their children, but only if they act
to create a connection with those children); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (invali
dating on equal protection grounds a state statute that presumed conclusively that unwed
fathers were unfit parents, when no similar presumption was made for unwed mothers). As
Carbone points out, pp. 164-79, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on unmarried fathers'
rights is not easy to rationalize, and may be explicable in part on the basis of an unstated
preference for unwed fathers who have maintained some sort of connection with their chil
dren's mothers. (This usually unstated preference is connected to, but goes beyond the more
frequently expressed preference for marriage. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263 ("The most
effective protection of the putative father's opportunity to develop a relationship with his
child is provided by the laws that authorize formal marriage and govern its consequences.").)
13. See, e.g., Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368 (Neb. App. 1997) (refusing to
modify custody based on the custodial parent's homosexuality and alcohol consumption);
Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987) (holding that an initial custody award could
not be made based solely on one parent's continued participation in polygamous practices);
Judith R. v. Hey, 405 S.E.2d 447 (W. Va. 1990) (reversing a court order that conditioned
continued custody on that parent's either marrying the man with whom she was cohabiting
or ending that relationship). Not all courts have followed this trend. See, e.g., Roe v. Roe,
324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985) (reversing the award of custody to a parent, the reversal based
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the focus more prominently to the interests of the child, rather than
using the children as rewards for complying with societal norms; and
(2) it reduces the number of times when courts must make controver
sial judgments about what is sometimes called "personal morality."14
This approach, however, can also lead to problem cases: As Carbone
notes (pp. 186-87), courts sometimes seem predisposed to ignore even
bad acts that should be seen as evidence of parental unfitness - most
egregiously, domestic violence.15
The growing legal disconnect between behavior to one's partner
(the decision to marry, followed by proper marital behavior) and one's
parental rights and obligations exemplifies a more basic shift in the
way family life is structured, perceived, and regulated. There was a
time when a combination of social norms and economic circumstances
meant that a woman who was pregnant would either marry the father
or give up the child for adoption; in an earlier era, such marriages
lasted because divorce was difficult and often (especially for marital
wrongdoers) expensive,16 and because women, with limited prospects
in the workplace and the legal disabilities under coverture, could
rarely afford to leave a bad marriage (pp. 88-90, 95). Today, a man
who gets a woman pregnant is less likely to feel obligated to marry
her, and a woman will frequently be willing either to raise the child on
her own or get an abortion (pp. 90-95).

solely on that parent's active homosexual relationship); cf Lynn D. Wardle, How Children
Suffer: Parental Infidelity and the "No-Harm" Custody Presumption (199�) (unpublished
manuscript) (arguing that a parent's adultery should be a factor against that parent's receiv
ing custody).
14. There is an ongoing debate about the extent to which the government should be
concerned, through criminal prohibitions or otherwise, with adult actions which affect only
the actors themselves. See generally John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND
UTILITARIANISM 1-133 (Bantam ed., 1993) (1859); Stephen, supra note 4; H.L.A. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963). For an overview of the debates, see BRIAN BIX,
JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 145-54 (2nd ed. 1999).
15. See, e.g., Collinsworth v. O'Connell, 508 So. 2d 744 (F!a. App. 1987) (affirming a de
cision granting both parents shared responsibility for their child, despite evidence of the fa
ther's violence against the mother). As Carbone also observes, however, p. 187, more recent
court judgments, abetted at times by legislative directives, have considered evidence of do
mestic violence in making custody decisions. See, e.g., Custody of Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434,
438 (Mass. 1996) (holding that in custody decisions the court must consider "the special risks
to the child in awarding custody to a father who had committed acts of violence against the
mother"); see also ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN.§ 25-403 (West 2000) (prohibiting the awarding
of joint custody where there has been domestic violence).
.

16. Divorce was expensive in the sense that the former husband's obligation to pay ali
mony would likely turn on whether he or his wife was at fault in the marriage - the "fault"
of one party (and the innocence of the other party) had to be shown before a court would
dissolve the marriage. See, e.g., GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 15,
38, 48, 50 (1991) (discussing alimony during the fault-divorce period). It may be, though, as
one historian has recently suggested, that for some unhappy spouses, "leaving was a possi
bility, even where legal divorce was not." HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA:
A HISTORY 1 (2000).

Plotting Love

May 2001)

1443

Carbone's attitude towards such changes in family life is implied
more than expressed; it is a mixture of resignation and approval: res
ignation, in that the changes seem the result of our reaction and adap
tation to other societal changes (for example, the greater equality of
women, including greater workplace opportunities; and the greater
availability of contraception and abortion);17 and approval, in that the
author, tacitly, seems to favor the greater autonomy and lower level of
moral supervision and criticism of people's romantic, sexual, and mari
tal lives. There is also a note of regret: h()wever problematic the for
mer approach to family life may have been in many ways (not least in
its exploitation of women), it appears to have been largely successful
in ensuring that children generally had the care of two parents, and
that resources were passed from one generation to the next. Carbone
raises reasonable doubts that our current approach to marriage, fam
ily, and children can work nearly as well (pp. 49-52, 126-27, 132).
II.

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM

Carbone gets to the heart of questions about family law reform
and policy: "With the dismantling of the fault system [of divorce] that
had championed the sexual division of marital labor, neither law nor
feminism supplied what should be the core of family regulation - the
identification of the distinctive family values for the law to promote
and protect" (p. 27). She is not referring to the "family values" of con
servative political rhetoric, but simply the sense of having some vision
of an ideal regarding how intimate and family life should be structured
(and regulated) within society.
In his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice Blackmun wrote: "We
protect the family because it contributes so powerfully to the happi
ness of individuals, not because of a preference for stereotypical
households."18 While that may be an accurate characterization of what
the Constitution does or should protect, as a matter of policy it is du
bious at best. We do have some notion as to the social benefits of mar
riage and families, even beyond their undoubted role in the happiness
and fulfillment of individuals. Stable marriages and families may be
valuable to society, not only as a good context in which to raise chil
dren, but also for the same reason that other intermediate institutions
(whether volunteer organizations, social organizations, or religious in
stitutions) are valuable to society's flourishing (pp. 38-40). However,
even were we to have a clear sense of where we wanted to go - which
social institutions and family structures to strengthen and which to dis
courage - it is far from clear how we can get there. As Carbone ac·

17. Pp. 53-66, 85-110. Carbone's general approach to historical analysis and social
change will be discuss�d in the next section.
·

18. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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knowledges, there are difficulties in "linking public policy concerns to
individual behavior at a time when older norms have given way, and
there is no consensus on their replacement" (p. 42).
Carbone brings light and insight to many current family law de
bates by placing them in their larger historical context. She effectively
uses history to undermine the arguments for certain current reform
proposals, and to alter the way many family law issues are perceived.19
However, her way of presenting our current social situation as the,
perhaps inevitable,20 result of long-term factors, factors largely beyond
our control and more or less impervious to manipulation through law,
works equally to undermine her own suggestions regarding legal and
social reform.21
If one goes back not just decades, but generations, even centuries,
one comes across a family structure quite different from the one that
predominates today: where the married couple and their children were
very much a part of the larger community, and under the constant su
pervision of that community (pp. 100, 123-24). "The household was
the basic unit of production and reproduction in a hierarchical society
in which church, community, and family overlapped. Without clear
boundaries between public and private, the individual never escaped
supervision."22 That family structure changed over time into one more
recognizable to modern eyes. Borrowing a term from Milton Regan,
Jr.,23 Carbone speaks of the "Victorian family" and describes it as de
veloping around the eighteenth century in both England and America
(pp. 99-100). Married couples gained separation from the community,
with significant consequences: (a) the raising of children became the
main responsibility of and, increasingly, the primary focus of, individ19. Looking at the longer term can clarify how we may be seeing current phenomena
against a false "baseline." Carbone is effective in reminding us that we seem constantly to be
comparing our current situation to the actual or imagined situation in the 1950s, when that
period was, over the longer historical view, the anomalous period. P. 88.
Attention to history can also lessen the tendency to speak of "the nature of marriage,"
for history shows how the institution has changed radically over previous centuries, and even
in the course of the most recent decades. See Brian Bix, Reflections on the Nature of Mar
riage, in REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY (Alan J.
Hawkins, Lynn D. Wardle & David Coolidge eds., forthcoming, 2001).
20. In Carbone's discussions, as in much historical work, it is hard to distinguish expla
nations that society changed in a certain way, from more ambitious claims that these changes
were inevitable given the prior conditions.
21. Carbone's inconsistency on the efficacy on legal intervention is set out insightfully
and at length in Katharine Silbaugh's review. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Accounting for Family
Change, 89 GEO. L.J. 923, 964-66 (2001) (reviewing From Partners to Parents).
22. P. 100. One might add that, especially prior to the industrial revolution, one's mar
riage partner was often also a partner in one's business, a needed extra hand in one's work,
whether one was working on the farm or as an artisan; this fact had obvious and important
implications for the way people thought about marriage and divorce. See E.J. GRAFF, WHAT
IS MARRIAGE FOR? 11- 16 (1999) (describing the historical "working marriage").
23. MILTON REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OFINTIMACY 4 (1993).
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ual families; and (b) there were growing demands on and greater ex
pectations for marriage, as the haven from commercial and public life,
and as the source of intimacy and emotional support (pp. 100-10).
Carbone portrays domestic life as being produced by broad ideas
regarding the family, combined with (related) ideas regarding gender
roles and sexuality. The Victorian family contained the earlier
mentioned isolation from the larger community and the separation of
public and private spheres, along with a strong sense of gendered
roles, both within and outside marriage (p. 101). The structure of do
mestic life was also strongly influenced by the sexual mores, as already
discussed24 (for example, that it was understood that when premarital
sex resulted in pregnancy, the couple married, and this understanding
was reinforced by strong social norms and sanctions (p. 91)).
The Victorian family has been transformed (or, if one prefers,
"undermined") by a series of societal changes in attitude and oppor
tunity: greater emphasis on individual fulfillment, higher levels of
premarital sex combined with the greater availability of contraception
and abortion, greater opportunity for women in the workplace, and
more social acceptance of nonmarital cohabitation, nonmarital births,
and divorce (pp. 93-110). The result has been significantly higher lev
els of divorce,25 nonmarital births, and children raised by single par
ents (pp. 88-90, 118-27).
There is currently much talk about, and some action toward, re
forming family law, often to try to bring us back to the allegedly bet
ter, more moral, and more responsible past. Many recent enacted and
proposed reforms in the family law area have been driven at least in
part by the general belief that children are harmed by current trends
in family structure, and that these trends can and should be fought.
AFDC benefits were modified in part because of the belief that the
prior benefit structure discouraged marriage and encouraged the birth
of nonmarital children;26 and various divorce reforms, including the
"covenant marriage" laws enacted in Louisiana, Arizona, and

24. Supra text accompanying note 1 6.
25. Where marriages were once held together by dependence, the stigma of divorce, or
strongly internalized feelings of duty and role, marriages now grounded on intimacy and
companionship are more fragile, for they have little reason to continue when those values
have faded. Pp. 1 04- 05.
26. P. 94; see also Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat: Constructing a New
Ideology of Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 41 5, 425-27 (1 999) (summa
rizing the pro-marriage, anti-illegitimate birth rhetoric related to welfare reform).
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Arkansas27 were justified in part by the harm allegedly being done to
children by divorce.28
While there are studies that seem to show that the children of sin
gle parents or divorced parents do less well than the children of intact
two-parent homes,29 Carbone argues that all this may show is that they
fare less well in this society, a society that is arguably built around the
"traditional" two-parent family (p. 49). Martha Fineman has argued
that our society does not do enough to support "inevitable depend
ency" (those who cannot care for themselves - the very young, the
very old, and the seriously ill) or "derivative dependency" (those, usu
ally women, who cannot support themselves because they are devoting
most or all of their time to caring for the "inevitably dependent").30
Fineman suggests shifting the state subsidization of the traditional
family to those providing the care, be they single parents, divorced
parents, or married parents.31 Carbone returns again and again to the
fictional character "Murphy Brown" because that character (and
many real-world counterparts with similar resources) has the wealth to
protect her child(ren) from many of the usual effects of not having a
second parent.32 If the problem of single parenthood is (only or pri
marily) that there is no one to support the caregiver, then (a) single
parents who have sufficient resources should not be criticized; and (b)
we should consider creating greater community and/or government
support for single caregivers who do not already have such resources
(pp. 51-52).

27. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 25-901 to - 906 (West 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§§
9: 272- 275.1 (West 2000); 2001 Ark. Acts 1 486.
28. See, e.g., Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and
Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 63-72 (1998) (summarizing the child-focused justifica

tions of the covenant marriage proposal).

29. These studies are complicated by related findings: The children of widowed parents
do not seem to be harmed (relative to the children of two-parent families) the way the chil
dren of unmarried single parents and divorced parents are, and the children of step-parents
do less well than those in other two-parent households. Pp. 11 1-1 4.
30. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES 1 61- 66 (1 995) (discussing the in
adequate societal responses to inevitable and derivative dependencies).
31 . P. 28 (quoting FINEMAN, supra note 30, at 233).
32. Pp. 44- 47, 51 . One can and should ask about the social forces and circumstances that
encourage the belief, including among many of the caretakers themselves, that taking care of
children is normally or ideally seen as primarily the responsibility of an isolated parent (usu
ally a mother) for whom caretaking is that parent's exclusive or predominant job. See
Katharine K. Baker, Taking Care of Our Daughters, 1 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 495 (1 997) (re
viewing FINEMAN, supra note 30) (suggesting that it is important for caretaking to be degen
dered).
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While Carbone has her doubts about most of the current crop of
reform proposals,33 she has her own ideas for change. For example, she
is concerned that the nuclear family can no longer work effectively for
the welfare of children because it can no longer shield children, espe
cially teenagers, from the dangers and temptations of the larger world
(pp. 221-26, 241). She calls, therefore, for some way of re-establishing
the ties between family and community that might bring in societal re
sources for helping to protect and raise those children (p. 241). Addi
tionally, she promotes a model of a generally egalitarian "supportive
partnership" in marriage (pp. 235�38). Far less clearly expressed is
what should or could be done in either case (by·way of legal or social
action) to get there from here.
This "black box" in Carbone's analysis, the mystery element that
explains the changes in family life over time and why certain reforms
have succeeded or failed, seems to be the same as the "black box" in
many economics-driven discussions of law: the internalized be
liefs/attitudes/values that some call morality, others sentiment (pp. 99,
235), and others "social norms."34 What is crucial for change is that
people's values and attitudes change. When such changes occur, par
allel legal reforms tend to follow (Carbone's example is no-fault di
vorce following a more individual- and autonomy-focused attitude to
wards marriage and a more tolerant attitude towards divorce (pp. 8990)). However, when proposed reforms act against such values and at
titudes, they are bound to fail. The question, then, is how to get people
to adopt desirable values and attitudes. For this most basic question,
Carbone offers no answers.35 This is neither surprising nor the justifi
cation for criticism; if we did know how to change "hearts and minds,"
we would have the key to political (and utopian) change, which politi
cians, reformers, and philosophers have sought for millennia.
III.

ENGAGEMENT WITH ECONOMICS

Beyond its clear merits as a guide to the current theoretical, em
pirical, and policy debates within family law, Carbone's book is impor
tant in the way it exemplifies the current engagement between family

33. She writes: "It is possible to demonstrate conclusively that children have suffered
from family instability without uncritically embracing proposals to restrict divorce or non
marital births." P. 11 8.
34. See infra note 53.
35. At one point, Carbone summarizes Stephanie Coontz's work on the connection be
tween women's increasing autonomy and the divorce rate by saying, "changes in behavior
preceded the changes in attitudes." P. 90. This only leads to the question, however, "what
(changes in values or attitude) caused the changes in behavior?" There is no obvious stop
ping point to such explanatory regresses.
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law and law and economics.36 Economic analysis, understood broadly
to include public choice, game theory, and other variations of rational
choice analysis, has become dominant, or at least highly influential, in
nearly every area of (American) legal scholarship.37 Family Law has
been one of the areas most resistant to the encroachment of economic
analysis,38 but in recent years the emphasis has been more on how to
co-opt, adapt, or modify economics analysis than on how to avoid or
refute it. Efforts to apply or adapt economic analysis to family law
have come from both directions: from economically minded theorists
trying to explain domestic relations (and domestic relations law), and
from family law scholars considering the value and limitations of eco
nomic analysis.39 Standard economic analysis as applied to domestic
relations starts from the assumption that individuals are trying to
maximize their self-interest (even) in that part of their lives; decisions
36. "Engagement" may be just the right word, as its two primary meanings show the
contrary aspects of the current connection between family law and law and economics: (1)
(romantic engagement) as a close connection, in contemplation of an even closer one; and
(2) (military engagement) as an event that is part of a larger struggle.
37. Some things are lost when "law and economics" is defined this broadly, with the im
plication that it is a monolithic whole. In fact, there are important debates and disagree
ments within this large category. For example, game theory entails a sharp critique of tradi
tional economic analysis, see infra note 43, and the approach of "new institutional
economics" used in Margaret Brinig's work, see MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT
TO COVENANT 6 (2000) also deviates from and criticizes the traditional approach, see
Thrainn Eggertsson, Neoinstitutional Economics, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE.LAW 665, 665 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (describing how this ap
proach varies from "neoclassical economics"). Many of the modern economic writers on
"social norms" also argue that traditional economic analysis is subject to basic criticisms. See,
e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 4 (2000) (criticizing "[t]he positive branch
of law and economics" for assuming that individuals are "unaffected by the attitudes of oth
ers" when they make choices).
38. The first important contribution to the economic analysis of family law may be
GARY s. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (enlarged ed., 1991) (1981). Economic at
tention to domestic relations is relatively recent. As Becker observes, "[a]side from the
Malthusian theory of population change, economists hardly noticed the family prior to the
1950s . . . . " BECKER, supra, at 3.
39. The first group would include Gary Becker, BECKER, supra note 38; Allen Parkman,
e.g., ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? (1992); Eric
Posner, POSNER, supra note 37, at 68-87 ("Family Law and Social Norms"); and Eric Ras
musen and Jeffrey Stake, e.g., Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ig
norance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453 (1998). The second group
would include Margaret Brinig, e.g., BRINIG, supra note 37; June Carbone, e.g., CARBONE,
FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILy LAw (2000); see also
Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL.
L. REV. 855 (1988); Ann Estin, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law
and the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989 (1995); Rhona Mahony, e.g.,
RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND BARGAINING
POWER (1995); Milton Regan, e.g., MILTON c. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER (1999);
Katharine Silbaugh, e.g., Katharine B. Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and
the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1996); Amy Wax, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Market: ls There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509
(1998); and Joan Williams, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND
WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000).
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whether and whom to marry, how to structure marital life, whether to
have children and how many, whether to divorce, etc., are all treated
as explicable in terms of preferences, incentives, and disincentives.40
(A core insight of law and economics, the Coase theorem, states that
in cases of incompatible rights or activities, it is the individuals' pref
erences and valuations that determine what occurs; law, the effect of
legal rules, is reduced to near irrelevance41 - though the application
of this claim to family law has been, strangely, relatively muted.42)

40. See, e.g., ALLEN M. PARKMAN, GOOD INTENTIONS GONE AWRY: NO-FAULT
DIVORCE AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY 4 (2000) ("Economists view the decision to marry
and, sometimes, to divorce as based on the benefits and the costs associated with those
choices . . . . Over time, the costs and the benefits of marriage and divorce can change, and
then the incentives to marry and to stay married also change.").
41. The Coase theorem states that in a world without transaction costs, the initial distri
bution of entitlements (for example, whether one party has the right to pollute or the other
party has the right to enjoin the pollution) will have no effect on the eventual distribution of
entitlements: entitlements will end up with the parties who value them the most. See Ronald
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), reprinted in R. H. COASE, THE
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95-156 (1988). Among the many efforts to summarize
Coase's Theorem are RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55-61 (5th ed.
1998), and BIX, supra note 14, at 183-87. Thus, whether, for example, A pollutes B's land or
not depends entirely on whether A values the right to pollute more than B values the right
not to be subject to pollution, and depends not at all on whether A or B starts with the right.
If A values the right more than B, but does not start with the right, A will simply pay B for
the right. See COASE, supra, at 97-1 14. The Market trumps the Law. Of course, and this is
Coase's point as well, our world is one of pervasive and often substantial transaction costs,
and under such conditions, the initial distribution of entitlements can affect the eventual dis
tribution. The extra costs of transacting (contacting the relevant parties, negotiating, drafting
the contract, etc.) may mean that A will not be able to buy out B's right, even though, trans
action costs aside, A values the right more than B. See id. at 114-19.
42. The most obvious and prominent battleground for the application of the Coase
theorem to family law is the question of whether the move to no-fault divorce caused the
recent rise in divorce rates. Some economic commentators, following the Coase theorem (or
a close analogue), and purporting to have data to back up the theorem's predictions, do
claim that the move to no-fault ("unilateral") divorce laws has had no effect on divorce
rates. See, e.g., H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and
Private Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437, 437, 452 (1986) (arguing that data supports a
Coase theorem-like model: "empirical results show that the divorce rates are not signifi
cantly different in unilateral and mutual consent states"); cf BECKER, supra note 38, at 15,
324-41 (modifying the conclusion of an earlier edition, that the change in divorce laws should
have no effect on divorce rates, but only to the conclusion that the change of divorce laws
explains a small part (only) of the change in divorce rates). On the other hand, many com
mentators, also apparently supported by empirical data, argue that no-fault has made a dif
ference. See, e.g., BRINIG, supra note 37, at 153-58; BECKER, supra note 38, at 15. One might
argue that the latter position is consistent with the Coase theorem on the basis that the theo
rem allows for legal rules to have effects when there are significant transaction costs. See su
pra note 41. "There is, however, little evidence that such problems (transaction costs] are
more pressing in the context of divorce than in other bargains. Even under fault-only re
gimes, the great majority of divorcing couples resolved their differences before litigation
through a separation agreement." BRINIG, supra note 37, at 154 (footnote omitted); see also
id. at 157 (summarizing an empirical study by Martin Zelder which concluded that "transac
tion cost barriers do not prevent the parties from bargaining around the divorce regime").
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An interesting development is a shift towards using game theory in
family law scholarship.43 Game theory, with its emphasis on strategic
behavior and imperfect and asymmetric information, seems particu
larly apt for discussions of "negotiations" between partners before,
during, and after marriage.44 The application of game theory to family
law appears promising in many ways, but it is still at an early stage, so
its strengths and limitations remain difficult to discern.
One point of tension between (many) family law scholars and
(many) law and economics scholars is the idea, assumption, or conten
tion that people acting .in love, .within marriage, or with their immedi
ate family are best understood as attempting to maximize their self
interest.45 (One must be careful about terminology: "self-interest
should not be confused with selfishness; the happiness (or for that
matter the misery) of other people may be a part of one's satisfac
tions. "46) The reason family law has always seemed a good candidate
to resist law and economics (rational choice theory) is that our actions
in the context of love and family seem to be among the actions least
likely to correspond to the "rational self-maximizer" model. Milton

43. Game theory has been defined as the study of the question: "How do, or should, in
dividuals conduct themselves when each realizes that the consequences of his individual acts
will depend in part on what other independent actors do?" Stephen W. Salant & Theodore
S. Sims, Game Theory and the Law: Ready for Prime Time?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1839, 1846
(1 996) (reviewing DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994))
(footnote omitted). The advantages of game theory over traditional neo-classical economic
analysis are well summarized by Kenneth Dau-Schmidt:
Under traditional analysis, you have a variety of basic assumptions: people act rationally,
perfect information, zero transaction costs. Under game theory, you can relax some of those
assumptions. In fact, the point of game theory

is to examine problems of imperfect informa

tion, strategic behavior or transaction costs. Where transactions costs and strategic behavior
are important, game theory can provide a superior model.

Kenneth Dau-Schmidt et al., On Game Theory and the Law, 31 L. & Soc'Y REV. 613, 616
(1997) (reviewing DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994)).
44. See, e.g., Wax, supra note 39 (showing how differences in bargaining power and bar
gaining position between men and women can lead to inequalities within marriage); cf
MAHONY, supra note 39 (using a negotiation-based analysis of domestic life that approxi
mates game theory); POSNER, supra note 37, at 68-87 (discussing family law issues using a
"social norms" analysis that is in turn built in large part on game theoretical notions, like
"signaling").
45. Becker writes: "In this book I develop an economic or rational choice approach to
the family. . . . The rational choice approach . . . assumes that individuals maximize their
utility from basic preferences tliat do not change rapidly over time . . . . " BECKER, supra
note 38, at ix.
46. POSNER, supra note 41, at 4. Becker is similarly careful to note that people can be,
and often are, altruistic, altruism being defined as when an individual's "utility function de
pends positively on the well-being of' another person. BECKER, supra note 38, at 278.
Becker does not deny that individuals have altruistic feelings towards their close relatives; to
the contrary, he goes to some length to consider the (economic) effects of pervasive altruism
within the family. Id. at 277-306.
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Regan's work47 picks up one aspect of that claim, by arguing that mar
ried individuals are (and often should be) thinking basically in "we"
terms rather than "I" terms. Regan argues that spouses move back
and forth between an "external stance" towards their marriage - a
critical and reflective stance that can be roughly equated with that of
economic analysis and utility maximizing - and an "internal stance,"
within which the marriage is part of a universe of shared meaning, a
starting place quite different from that of individual utility maximiza
tion.48 Thus, Regan's response to a comment like "spouses will stick
with a marriage only if it produces a.marital surplus - in the form of
potentially utility-enhancing gains for each party - and only if each
spouse receives some share of the surplus,''49 is that it misses the extent
to which married people do50 think in terms of the couple or the family
as the agent whose interests are to be maximized, and not each person
as an individual agent.51
The problem of bounded rationality offers another basis for re
sisting law and economics52 - in general, but especially in the area of
domestic relations. There are certain kinds of choices most individuals
do not make in a rational fashion, as "rational" is defined in economic
analysis.53 These types of choices would seem to include many of those
47. See REGAN, supra note 39. For an insightful critique of Regan's book, see Katharine
B. Silbaugh, One Plus One Makes Two, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 109.(Autumn 2000).
48. On the difference between "internal" and' " external" stances, see REGAN, supra
note 39, at 5-6, 15-30; on the equation between the economic perspective and the external
stance, see id. at 33-86.
49. This is Amy Wax's summary of the rational choice approach to marriage. Wax, su
pra note 39, at 529 (footnote omitted). Wax expressly indicates that she is not affirming the

validity of the rational choice model and that she ·is aware of the problems bounded ration
ality may create for that model. Id. at 526-27 n.32.
50. And, Regan might add, "should."
51. See REGAN, supra note 39, at 62-73 (arguing that economic analysis cannot account
for the "internal perspective"). Such a claim goes beyond, and is more complicated than, a
Beckerian concession that individuals can be altruistic. See supra note 46. Under Regan's
analysis, spouses do not merely altruistically desire good things for their partners and chil
dren; they identify themselves with marriage or the family. See REGAN, supra note 39, at 5-6,
22-30, 62-73.

52. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (collecting articles about bounded rationality); BEHAVIORAL
LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (collecting articles discussing the implica
tions of bounded rationality for law and economics). It should be noted that some more re
cent variations of economic analysis do try to take account <;>f bounded rationality. See, e.g.,
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
·
IMPLICATIONS 7 (1 975) (describing the importance of bounded rationality to Williamson's
approach to new institutional economics).
53. When people do not act as they might be expected to under a rational choice model,
economic theorists would once have looked only to high transaction costs, or to some other
sort of identifiable "'market failure." See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 40-43 (3rd ed., 2000) (discussing "market failure"). More recently, the law and
economics theorists have looked towards "social norms" to explain the deviation from "ra
tional" behavior - but this has only led to efforts to explain and predict the development of
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central to family law: the decision to marry, the decision to divorce,
the decision to sign a premarital agreement, and so on.54 To the extent
that the central model of law and economics significantly distorts the
decisionmaking process it purports to represent, there are reasons to
doubt the efficacy of the approach. Law and economics theorists might
reasonably respond, to this criticism and to other similar challenges,
that even if their approach falls short of a full explanation, it can ex
plain some phenomena that might otherwise seem mysterious, and
therefore should be kept as a tool, even as we recognize that this tool
is inadequate for offering a complete explanation of domestic and in
timate relations.55
Carbone's contributions to this ongoing dialogue include her abil
ity to synthesize - concisely and in understandable prose - a vast
amount of work by economists, the critics of economics, and people
working in other fields. More pointedly, she shows how economic
analysis in the domestic relations area has sometimes fallen short be
cause of insufficient attention to culture and history.56 She favors theo
ries that "pay attention not just to financial incentives . . . but [also] to
the psychological and cultural factors that underlie decision
making . . . " (p. 95). Carbone's summary of the historical work on the
development of the family shows how explanations grounded solely or
primarily on economics· have failed,57 while simultaneously showing
how attention needs to be paid to economic class within work about
the family (pp. 55-110, 124-26, 308 n.1).
social norms in rational choice terms. See, e.g., Conference, Social Norms, Social Meaning,
and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537-823 (1998) (discussion by a num
ber of prominent scholars of the law and economics approach to social norms).

54. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Robert Emery, When Every Relationship ls Above Aver
age: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM.

BEHAv. 439 (1993) (using survey data to show that couples about to marry tend to be overly
optimistic about the chances that they will be able to avoid divorce, or if divorced, that the
child support obligor will pay the full amount owed); Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage,

40

& MARY L. REV. 145, 193-200 (1998) (discussing the rationality problem in the context
of premarital agreements); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits
of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 254-58 (1995) (describing how "bounded rationality" can
explain the restrictions on the enforceability of premarital agreements); Ziva Kunda, Moti
vated Inference: Self-Serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories, 53 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 636, 636 (1987) (describing how people generate self-serving
theories to convince themselves that their chance of divorce is far less than the general di
vorce rate).
55. Cf DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 4-5 (1991) (making a similar claim for public choice theory).
56. As Carbone recognizes, economists have not entirely ignored history. See, e.g.,
BECKER, supra note 38, at 85 (discussing some historical aspects of polygamy); pp. 55-57
(summarizing Friedrich Engels' historically based economic analysis).
57. Pp. 58-59, 90-99. Purely economic explanations that seem to have been rebutted by
more careful study of the data include purported connections between industrialization and
the development of the nuclear family, pp. 55-59, and between welfare benefits and non
marital birth rates, p. 94.
WM.
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While economic explanation might be adequate (and more) for
"snapshot" analyses - given people's preferences, how will they react
to a particular choice, or how will the sum of choices within a popula
tion be affected by a change in incentives caused by (say) a new law?
- it is often less useful in explaining and predicting over the longer
term. That is, economics is better at discussing how people will act
given their preferences, and less good at predicting how and why peo
ple's preferences will change. There are a number of examples in
Carbone's book of longer-term explanation and the shortfalls of eco
nomic analysis there. For example, there is currently a divergence in
expectations between men and women regarding marriage roles, dif
ferences that in turn vary as one moves from class to class, and among
different ethnic and racial groups (p. 19). In subgroups where women
generally expect or demand a relatively egalitarian division of roles
and men generally expect or demand a relatively tradi
tional/hierarchical division of roles, the result has been a lower rate of
marriage.58 The question then becomes: if people value marriage (and
the benefits that can be received from it) significantly, why do they not
"renegotiate" the terms of marriage (and adjust their attitudes ac
cordingly) in order to marry?59 If the answer is because the individuals
in question value those terms of marriage and attitudes towards mar
riage so much higher than the benefits of marriage that there is no
point where the trade-off would be worthwhile,60 then one can ask,
how did the individuals come to value these attitudes or terms of mar
riage so highly? While the change in values might have an economic
explanation, most of the evidence to date seems not to support that
conclusion.61

58. P. 19. The most extreme example may be in the African-American community,
which once had marriage rates far higher than that for whites, but now has much lower rates.
Pp. 78-80. While the explanation of this change is controversial and likely reflects a multi
tude of factors, at least one commentator has attributed the change in large part .to differing
attitudes among African-American men and women to marriage roles. ORLANDO
PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES OF SLAVERY IN Two AMERICAN
CENTURIES 93-132 (1998).
59. Pp. 18-19. Carbone indicates that just such a "renegotiation" took place in the nine
teenth century, after "women's greater economic independence, however minimal in today's
terms, corresponded with a greater degree of family instability." P. 230.
60. There are other factors and explanations worth considering. As Eric Posner re
minded me (in commenting on an earlier draft), the state, through its laws, puts some limits
on the renegotiation, for example by prohibiting polygamy and (in most jurisdictions) same
sex marriage. Robert Gordon (also commenting on an earlier draft) speculated that men and
women sometimes view marriage as a bundle of goods, and when those bundles overlap very
little (as might be the case between an egalitarian/romantic view of marriage and a tradi
tional/hierarchical view) and the parties are unwilling to unbundle the goods, fewer people
might reach negotiated arrangements.
61. See supra note 57; see also PATTERSON, supra note 58, at 93-132 (offering a largely
non-economic explanation for attitudes within the African-American community).
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The current generation of family law theorists and law and eco
nomics theorists have shown that there is much that rational choice
analysis can offer to the understanding of the domestic life and law,
but they have also shown this approach's limits. The areas that interest
many family law scholars the most - explaining familial and intimate
behavior on one hand, and trying to predict, control or reform such
behavior on the other hand - may be the areas where law and eco
nomics has the least to offer.62
CONCLUSION
While it seems a truism that every generation believes it is living at
a crucial moment, and that change is occurring at unprecedented lev
els, when Carbone makes claims of this kind about the modern family
- and family law and policy - it is hard to disagree. As she writes:
"In the [last] twenty years . . . there is very little about the family that
has not changed, and few verities that remain unchallenged" (p. 48).
From Partners to Parents gives an excellent field guide to these
changes, offering perspectives from history, economics and political
theory.63 Carbone shows how both family law doctrine and social
thought have focused on the care of children but have unmoored that
concern from any focus on the parents' behavior toward one another.
The result has been a confused drifting in family law policy in general,
and the regulation of marriage in particular. Additionally, Carbone's
text, not always intentionally, leaves one cautious, even pessimistic,
about the ability of government (or anyone else) to do much about the
problems relating to the family. However, such caution may not be entirely a bad thing.
·

62. Which, of course, is not to say that any other single school or approach has done sig
nificantly better in this area.
63. Three small corrections and amendments should be offered:
(1) The reference to "Carl Macintyre," p. 38, is an unintended conflation of the family
law scholar Carl Schneider and the moral philosopher Alasdair Macintyre.
(2) A footnote, p. 295 n.40, misstates the holding of Ireland v. Smith, 547 N.W.2d 686
(1996). That decision - an appeal from a highly publicized lower-court custody decision that
seemed to punish a young woman's decision to put her child in day care while she went to
university - did not "uph[o]ld an award of custody to a father whose own mother planned
to care for the child." P. 295 n.40. In fact, the decision upheld an intermediate appellate
court, which had reversed and remanded the lower court award of custody to the father.
Ireland, 547 N.W.2d at 692.
(3) The reader should be told that the (initially startling) 1646 Colonial Massachusetts
statute, p. 296 n.1, for the execution of recalcitrant children, simply restates (almost verba
tim) Biblical language. See Deuteronomy 21: 18-21. As Carbone writes, there is no evidence
that any child was ever actually executed under this statute. P. 296 n.l.
·

